The medical tropes which appear so frequently in Aristotle's writing are reflections of his fundamental view of reality. In a philosophical work, the use of a certain example or metaphor sometimes reaches a very high frequency or density; the reader is compelled to see that trope or example as a fundamental term, a governing image by which to interpret the work as a whole. The recurrence of the example of health reaches such a density in the work of Aristotle, a theme repeated over and over with widespread and ambiguous impact. Such a theme is different from a key concept; an author is usually well aware of the importance and role of such a concept-“will to power” in Nietzsche, “dialectic” in Hegel, “sense impression” in Hume. The “key concept” occupies the attention of the thinker, but the “theme” (as I am using it here) structures the philosophy work from below, unconsciously; and it does so throughout the entire corpus of the author’s work. From the perspective of intellectual history, the theme of medicine in Aristotle should be explicated by reconstructing the medical knowledge of his time in a way that elucidates his philosophy. Let us follow the trope of medicine throughout the universe as Aristotle saw it, starting with the semantic domain of health itself.
First, two quotations stating the relative position of medicine in
Aristotle’s system:
It behooves the natural scientist to obtain a clear
view of the first principles of health and disease, inasmuch as neither health
nor disease can exist in lifeless things. Indeed, we may say of most physical inquirers,
and of those physicians who study their work more philosophically, that while
the former complete their works with a disquisition on medicine, the latter
start with a consideration of nature.[1]
And, the obverse of this statement
also holds:
Not only the physician but also the natural scientist
must...give an account of the causes (of health and disease)...those physicians
who are cultivated and learned make some mention of natural science...while the
most accomplished investigators into nature generally push their studies so far
as to conclude with an account of medical principles.[2]
Aristotle was quite a naturalist; he carried out “biological research”[3], and about 25% of
his surviving written work is of a biological nature.[4] In the wider context of Aristotle’s thought
on nature (φυσιs), the biological world provides the model used to address problems about the metaphysics of substance,
flux and identity. That set of problems had
been articulated by the Presocratics regarding the possibility of identity
within flux; Aristotle inherited those problems, and his solution involved a
theory of form and matter-a hylomorphic theory.
That theory grounds an account of generation and corruption which serves
as a logic of identity within and despite the flux of appearances. In other words, Aristotle applied his
observations of nature to the philosophical puzzles of his predecessors. Let us outline this application with an
emphasis on the role of medicine.
Health is a state of affairs which persists over time, a habit or
disposition (διαθεσις)[5],
“the order and arrangement (ταχις) of
that which has parts”[6],
the result of a set of relations rather than an actual entity. More exactly, “health is a blending of
elementary materials in proper proportion which make up the body’s parts.”[7]“Thus,
we view bodily excellences (like health...) as dependent upon a proportionate
mixing of hot and cold elements within the body...” (Metaphysics, 246b4-6) It is
perhaps because health is a set of relations that it is apprehended by the mind
(νους) whereas both artifacts and the
plastic and performing arts are apprehended by the senses.[8] In order to define a thing, we should
identify the set of things in which it belongs, then list the differences which
distinguish it within that set.[9] By that reckoning, the invisibility of health
is one of the outstanding differentia of medicine from the other arts (τεχνη) (such as dancing or farming).
The doctor’s art has as its goal-its final cause-the production of health
in a living being. Like the art (τεχνη) of farming, medicine goes along with nature (φυσις), cooperating with its internal
goals. As such, medicine is unusual; for
most τεχνη have a more violent
relationship to nature. Instead of
interrupting the goal (τελος) of a
natural thing (as trees are destroyed in the building of ships), medicine works
toward health, which is a fundamental goal of living things determined not by
human use, but by φυσιs.
[1]. Aristotle, Sense and Sensibilia 436a20 J. I.
Bearne, trans. p. 693; see also Posterior
Analytics 72a1-6, pp. 115-6 in The
Complete Works of Aristotle , vol. I Jonathan Barnes, ed. Princeton, 1984
pp. 14-5 (references from the biological works and the Organon are drawn from
this volume) and Metaphysics 1029b
ff. Richard Hope, trans. Columbia, 1952 p. 134
[2]. Aristotle Parva Natura (On Youth and Old Age) 480b20-30, p. 763
[3]. George A. Kennedy,
introduction to the Rhetoric, Oxford,
1991 p. 6
[4]. Allan Gotthelf and James G.
Lennox (contributing eds.) Philosophical
Issues in Aristotle’s Biology Cambridge, 1987 p. 5
[5]. Aristotle, Categories 8b27-9a4 J. L. Ackrill,
trans. pp. 14-5
[6]. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1022b1-2, p. 113
[7]. Aristotle, Parva Natura (On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration) 479a8-9 G. R.
T. Ross, trans. p. 760
[8]. Aristotle, Parts of Animals 639b17 A. L. Peck,
trans. Harvard, pubs. (Loeb) 1945 p. 57
[9]. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1037b29-1038a35 p. 157 and Posterior Analytics 97a29 Barnes, trans.
p. 161
Why is health invisible? Is it because (only the effects of) ill-health show up?
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